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Abstract: The brain is composed of mutually inconsistent modules that contain contradictory beliefs. What 
consequences could this view have on argumentation? In order to sketch an answer, first the family of concepts of 
what is called generalized deception is discussed; then, this discussion is applied to the problem of the social 
influence bias to observe both how the mind works strategically wrong and what kind of arguments are used within 
this mental design in a social argumentative context.  
 




I cheated myself, 
Like I knew I would, 
I told you I was trouble, 
You know that I'm no good 
Amy Winehouse 
 
Self-deception. Perhaps that is where it all starts. For example, the legal, technical definition of 
prevarication, a concept which is part of the semantic family of self-deception, refers to the 
committed crime of deliberately avoiding duties. What justification could a person have for 
neglecting his duties? A benign self-deceptive justification would certainly come to mind first. 
This is similar to the transgression that Searle (2001) describes, following the Greek idea of 
akrasia, as the weakness of not acting according to reasons that we give ourselves, this is to say, 
the weakness of the will doing something contrary to what reason directs us to do. Hasn’t this 
happened to all of us at least once? 
 As will be discussed later, many authors agree that our mind operates with a structure 
designed for strategic self-deception. So, the weakness that Searle observes is only the tip of the 
iceberg of many layers that sometimes overlap. In this work I will address various layers of a 
conceptual family which I will put together under the notion of generalized deception. I will 
consider them in the context of the agent's intention while in the act of convincing or persuading 
someone, i.e., when we try to convince someone of something by means of arguments we do not 
really believe in, or when we know that the argument is false, or when we know our point of 
view (which we are communicating) is wrong. At the base of this behaviour there is a cognitive 
assumption which I endorse in this work, namely that cognition is directed at action, at designing 
its environment (Sterelny, 2012). Thus, self-deception, deception, lies and manipulation will be 
explained in line with the objective of an agent who prevaricates to achieve certain individual 
and social aims so as to manage his social and informative environment.   
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I will analyze recent hypotheses regarding this prevaricative structure of the mind, such 
as that of Kurzban (2012), who has proposed that it functions strategically in an evocative way 
for persuasive purposes. The central idea of this author is that the brain is composed of mutually 
inconsistent modules that contain contradictory beliefs. I can believe something that an unbiased 
person with the same information will not believe (for example, that I am an excellent driver, 
despite having crashed into a wall only moments prior). As Kurzban (2012) points out, “some 
part of the mind—some modules—are designed for functions other than being right because of 
certain strategic advantages” (p. 130). Biases are the clearest example of this designed cognitive 
structure for communicating strategically false beliefs. Trivers (2011) maintains a similar view, 
considering that in order to lie we hide or disguise relevant information, and particularly, we 
disguise our intention to deceive, which is the easiest to do by means of a self-deceptive 
mechanism. 
Which consequences could this way of understanding the mental design have for 
argumentative activity? In this article I will examine a possible effect through the analysis of the 
social influence bias to show that this makes us produce arguments that are purely deceptive in 
order to maintain our preferred self-presentation. To further elaborate these consequences, I will 
proceed in the following way: in section 2, I will demarcate and characterize the behavioural 
family of what I’ve called generalized deception, specifically, self-deception, deception, lies and 
manipulation, and I will do so by combining analytic, psycho-cognitive and evolutionary 
perspectives, with special attention to self-deceptive behaviour, as this will offer a certain 
informative framework that can be applied to other phenomena; in section 3, I will focus on 2 
examples of the social influence bias, taking the Asch experiment as the starting point to later 
analyze a humorous example. My conclusions appear to be pessimistic. It is clear to me that 
covering various phenomena in a single paper carries the risk of being incomplete, but I will do 
my utmost to resolve this problem. I hope that this is not a self-deceptive idea.  
 
2. Generalized deception  
 
2.1. Self-deception: the advantage of designing ourselves with what is not true 
 
Self-deception is one of the most pernicious mental behaviours; this has always been believed by 
people, like Williams (2002), who do not really know how our mind works; a mind that works as 
it does only after a long and continuos evolutionary journey in search of its cognitive 
optimization. 
As part of the literature shows (Kurzban, 2012; Trivers, 2011; von Hippel & Trivers, 
2011), self-deception might have evolved to facilitate interactional deception, that is, to allow 
individuals to ignore the evidence of conscious deception that could reveal the intent to deceive. 
All forms of deceiving others (such as lying, ignoring the truth, equivocating the truth, casting 
doubt on the truth) are, in turn, forms of self-deception. What could be the advantages of having 
this possibility of mental and discursive behaviour, which clearly produces beliefs that are, at the 
least, inconsistent? The cited authors coincide in there being two additional reasons to behave 
self-deceptively, apart from hiding conscious deception: 1) reducing the normal cognitive cost 
associated with deception; and 2) it could minimize the punishment if the deception is 
discovered. An appropriate example given by von Hippel and Trivers (2011) is this: A man 
arrives home late because he got caught up in a conversation with a female colleague, and he is 
confronted by his wife who wants to know why he came home late. If he responds by saying that 
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his boss asked him to work overtime, he’d be lying to her; if he tells her that he was talking with 
a female colleague, he’d be honest. However, if he changes the topic—perhaps by commenting 
that the dinner smells good—and distracting his wife from the question at hand, it wouldn’t then 
be clear whether he is lying or simply didn’t answer. There is no definitive way of knowing 
whether he was deceiving his wife without knowing his intention for changing the topic or 
without knowing more about the relationship between him, his wife and his colleague.  
There exist distinct types of self-deception depending on the process involved. One is 
produced by the strategic search for biased or tendentious information; another produced by 
biased or tendentious interpretative processes; and another one by the biased or tendentious 
memory process. What determines these types of self-deception is that people favour desired 
information over undesired information in order to accommodate their objectives or motivations. 
This view clearly defers from the standard position about self-deception, which maintains that 
the self-deceptive agent sustains two representations of reality, where the truth preferably is 
stored in the unconscious and falsehood in the conscious mind.  
It follows from this that not all biases in information processing are self-deceptions, 
otherwise psychology of reasoning would be without an object of study since bias only reflects 
cognitive shortcuts, errors and differential weighing between prior and new information. It 
should then be insisted that self-deception proceeds when individuals favour desirable 
information over the undesirable in a way that reflects their purposes: if strengthening the self-
image renders the individual more predisposed to look for negative information about himself, 
then we have evidence that previously avoiding negative information about himself has been 
motivated and as a result self-deception proceeds.  
Self-deception, from an evolutionary point of view, is an answer to deception. The fact is 
that individuals fall short of the truth to obtain resources, which otherwise wouldn’t be provided 
for them. Approximately half of the time of their lives, people deceive to obtain benefits for 
themselves (de Paulo & Kashy, 1998). Facing this not very auspicious scenario, self-deceptive 
behaviour then would have co-evolved with deception, since the selective pressure must have 
favoured the deceived agent to develop ways of detecting deception, and in turn the deceiver 
adding new ways of concealing, which is what self-deception does. The deceiver self-deceives to 
elude realization and detection. Von Hippel and Trivers (2011) sustain that self-deception offers 
an important tool in the co-evolutive fight to allow the person who is deceiving the opportunity 
to deceive without a cognitive burden, without conscious repression, without the growing 
nervousness and the other idiosyncratic indicators with which deception is perpetrated. When we 
deceive ourselves, we better deceive others. 
Trivers (2011) points out that self-deception could be at the service of social progress. 
The benefit of self-deception goes far beyond convincing others of specific lies, for self-
deception could help us to accumulate more social benefits by means of self-valoration (self-
inflation or self-enhancement). Such as has been reported some time ago (Penrod & Cutler, 1995; 
Zarnoth & Snieke, 1997), trust determines social influence: If people are trusted, it is likely that 
their advice will be followed. The more people strengthen their self-image and improve their 
self-confidence, the greater the possibility of influencing others and being elected to execute 
important social roles. For this reason, self-valoration should be omnipresent in people and 
people should believe their own self-enhanced stories. 
Self-deception emerges when we do a biased search for information, whether it be a 
lengthy or in-depth search, a selective search, or while practising selective attention. The first 
case is about avoiding further information that is incompatible with the desires or purposes of the 
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agent. It seems to be then that people don’t tell themselves the whole truth, but rather a partial 
and preferable truth (Ditto y López, 1992); with respect to the selective search, one could say 
that although you do not know what is around the corner, some corners seem to offer more 
desirable information than others. Armitage, Harris, Hepton and Napper (2008) demonstrate that 
smokers were more prone to accepting anti-smoking brochures, if they had already self-affirmed 
reflections on their smoking habit; selective attention is related to codifying or paying attention 
selectively to some aspects of the available information that we prefer to be the truth in contexts 
where information is perceptually accesible and does not require to be discovered. 
Evidently, a favourite form of self-deception is to interpret the world in a tendentious 
way, or in a biased way, by avoiding critical information that is incompatible with our initial 
position, etc. Without a doubt, the cognitive mechanism of forgetting what threatens our 
preferences helps; in fact, we can pay attention to undesirable information and even accept it in 
order to set a momentary state of affairs, but this does not guarantee that we are able, or want to, 
recuperate it later. In the same way, rationalization is one of the elemental strategies to self-
deceive, and emerges when we avoid telling the truth about the real motives behind our 
behaviour in order to make it more socially acceptable, even when we remember accurately the 
wrongdoings of that behaviour. Less dignified, is the case of convincing oneself that the lie is 
true: this is the classic form of self-deception. This form of self-deception is often difficult to 
verify, since it is complicated to know if the person believes the lie that she is telling others, 
because the situation that motivates lying to oneself at the same time motivates lying to the 
others.1  
Why do we self-deceive so much? So as to deceive without too much remorse. This 
creates some room for optimism. The person who applies an optimistic self-deception, according 
to von Hippel and Trivers (2011), seems to create a prophecy that by its very nature tends to be 
fulfilled, which is similar to the confidence in an eventual success leading optimists to persevere 
in the face of difficulties. As a result of these processes, optimists get more financial and social 
benefits than less optimistic individuals (Carver & Sneider, 2002; Solberg Nes & Segerstrom, 
2006). It is also thought that self-deception is a useful tool in negotiating the social world; or it is 
a defensive strategy adopted by individuals who have difficulty in facing the threats of the world. 
Whatever the answer may be, there are high costs to pay, for example, the loss of honest 
information: it is suggested that some individuals have difficulty distinguishing the source of 
their memories from their actual memories, and are more susceptible to using false memories. 
If to promote myself I have to use psychological propaganda, I would spare no means. 
This is one of the hypotheses which Kurzban (2012) offers, and in my opinion, it is one of the 
boldest elaborations to answer why we self-deceive, although, as we will see, Kurzban reserves 
the notion of self-deception for a more specific behaviour that conveniently administers self-
representations which don’t coincide with facts. If I want to, for example, make others believe 
that I have control over everything that happens to me (despite the fact that I am inundated 
relentlessly by events), I won’t hesitate to communicate that that is the case. This, according to 
Kurzban, clearly shows what he calls to be strategically wrong. Kurzban’s hypothesis (2012) is 
that if the thesis of the modularity of the mind is correct, then there exists no such thing as me 
myself, unitary and real, but rather a mental structure composed of a series of modules 
                                                          
1 There is, certainly, a series of deceptions caused by neurological damage (Trivers, 2011), such as that produced by 
corpus callosum agenesis, which happens when the corpus callosum is separated and leaves the two hemispheres 
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coordinatively functioning without fear of inconsistency and contradiction (p. 98ff.). For the 
author, inconsistency and contradiction are, in fact, productive and advantageous achievements. 
Self-deception, the author reminds us, holds a paradox, since we know that something can 
deceive another thing, but in self-deception, does one’s mind deceive one’s mind?  
It is a fact that there are contexts that invite self-deception, when, for example, we have to 
make some self-evaluation on matters without consensus: Is a good professor the one who knows 
how to communiate relevant information about a topic or the one who is quoted by her peers? 
Professors tend to evaluate themselves above average (I do it perfectly!), whatever the reason 
they give. What is strategically wrong about a professor who thinks in this way? This wrong 
behaviour is used to advance a better representation of myself than I think is the case, better 
because it gives me an advantage in the social world (communicating that I am an above average 
good professor). To be strategically wrong is socially advantageous for its persuasive potential: if 
all believe such a representation, then you will be placed better. Kurzban (2012) emphasizes that 
to be placed better means, from the point of view of an evolutionary perspective, that the mental 
design system must be explained and evaluated by virtue of their effects: being wrong 
strategically in some contexts sometimes produces good benefits (p. 101). 
In 1989, the psychologist Shelley Taylor (1989) published a book in which she unfolded 
the conclusions of years of experimental studies on positive illusions. Positive illusions show 
that: 1) People think they have more favourable characteristics than they actually have, 2) that 
they have more control over what will happen to them than what they are actually able to control, 
and 3) that they are more optimistic about the future than facts can justify. The point, 
nevertheless, is not to think of self-deception in terms of positive benefits for our mental health, 
but simply in terms of the strategic benefits of being wrong. The sad dimension of this picture, if 
anyone wants to see it that way, is that self-deception has a robust recursive structure: we think 
that we are better than the average because (we think that) we are not biased in thinking that we 
are better than the average. 
The specific feature of self-deception for Kurzban (2012), nevertheless, is the 
simultaneous generation in the brain of at least two representations of mutually contradictory 
beliefs. Loyal to a naturalist position, Kurzban avoids using the notion of “mind” to reduce the 
temptation of assimilating the idea of a unitary “self” contained in the mind. This position differs 
from the positive illusions angle, since in the latter there is generally only one, obviously 
unjustified, positive belief about a situation. The thesis is that if we have a unitary model of the 
mind, then believing two contradictory things is problematic. The message is not to accept that 
two mutually contradictory beliefs kept in the mind is unproblematic because it has social 
benefits, but to distinguish it as a type of design with a persuasive purpose, which tries to achieve 
a certain consequence in the surrounding world of the agent. Viewing the mind from a modular 
perspective, the idea is that some of the modules are occupied by true representations or beliefs, 
and others by false ones. It is a matter of context and goals of the agent which one imposes on 
the other. If the agent believes that it is a good strategy to maintain mutually contradicting beliefs 
and to constantly communicate the one which is most convenient for him (i.e., that he is a really 
good professor!), in the long run, this will cause him damage. Honesty, at the end of the day, is 
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2.2. Deception 
 
Thus we self-deceive, we lie to ourselves, but Kurzban (2012) helps us to understand that this 
occurs inside the multi-modular brain, in which the modules are coordinated to produce an effect 
in the world that facilitates us with some kind of social success. 
How does the mechanism of self-deception differ from the mechanism of deception? 
Apart from deception obviously referring to another person, or to a group, deception violates an 
almost universal moral command of avoiding doing to others what we wouldn’t wish to be done 
to us… unless, of course, we like to be cheated and being lied to. 
 Deception is often seen as a prototype of damage. Yet there are deceptions which after an 
initially mild damage, could produce further good; this would be the parallel case of the 
benevolent lie. However, deception has some characteristics which make it, from an analytic 
point of view, completely distinct to other phenomena. When a professional football player on 
the attack moves his waist in a certain direction, the defence automatically follows him, but then 
the attacker takes the opposite direction, it could be said that, technically, he has deceived the 
defence. The deception occurs when it is induced or implied to be believed false. In deception, 
what is false is not said, and sadly for the deceived agent, the responsibilities of the 
consequences are transferred to the victim. So, the deceiver, certainly has the burden of the 
responsibility of concealing the actual state of affairs, but he who accepts the implication shows 
a lack of epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010). About this last feature of deception, 
D’Agostini (2014) correctly wonders in what sense deception is less severe, from a moral point 
of view, than directly saying something false, that is—lying.  
Catholicism (through Saint Augustine in particular) holds the doctrine that a false 
statement is worse than a false implication, and that the commitment to the spoken word is not 
extended to its consequences. The first reason is weak, and the second comes from a bad 
pragmatic analysis. Moving full responsibility to the victim, in fact, turns the deceiver into 
someone committing double harm: she implies what is false, and does so knowingly; on the other 
hand, if it were certain that the speaker does not commit to the consequences of what she said, 
then many speech acts could not exist, such as promises. 
 Deception, nonetheless, has clear adaptive advantages, and it is found in all kinds of 
species, in particular in those that move in highly socialized environments. As Cheney and 
Seyfarth (1990) predicted, in those species deception evolved when misleading cues became 
more subtle and less repeated, the only way in which deception could have become a stable 
evolutionary strategy. Trivers (2011), along a similar vein, sustains that deception sharpens 
mental capacity: “We can then say that deception generates evolutionary intelligence in both 
rival parts, although more probably in the part that observes” (p. 37). Camouflaging, surprising, 
deceiving, appearing to be deceived, are behaviours of an evolutive game that has produced the 
trivial virtue of these behaviours, and more often than not, unconscious, automatic or 
unintentional. But precisely this apparent unconsciousness pushes toward self-deception, that is, 
as has been previously stated, self-deception is the evolutive achievement of reducing the 
cognitive burden of undertaking the deception.  
 Deception differs from lying because it can be carried out with or without linguistic 
material, while lying ocurrs only through a linguistic act. Deception, when it is linguistic, 
operates with assumptions, thereby activating a deductive protocol (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) or 
an inferential mental model (Johnson-Laird, 2008) that is insincere—or does not coincide with 
reality—and, for this reason, drives the deceived agent to make mistakes, probably causing her 
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some kind of damage. The deceiver could act, perhaps, without bad intentions and the deceived 
agent perhaps could act without completely noticing the slyness. In deception there is always an 
invitation for doubt. 
 Some literature, from the analysis of discourse, makes stark distinctions, cataloguing 
deception as a synonym for manipulation (Oswald, 2014). As will become apparent, this is an 
evident analytical error; other authors within discourse analysis, indicate that deception has 
manipulation among its possibilities (Blass, 2005; Galasinski, 2000), but deception is sometimes 
a sufficient condition for manipulation, but not a necessary condition. 
 To finish this section, it is important first to recall an essential fact in order to understand 
the ontogeny of deception; and secondly, to note that the discursive production of deception 
doesn’t necessarily go hand in hand with the intention of deception. With regard to the first, as 
Rochat (2014) emphasizes well, the ability to deceive—or rather the production of non-verbal 
deception signs—starts in childhood around 21 months of age, long before the development of 
explicit mind theory and the understanding of false beliefs, when we recognize ourselves as 
individuals and begin consciously to share with the other. To be able to do this we need to have 
the ability to perform a convenient self-presentation in front of others. This coincides with the 
time to play with assumptions, imaginary worlds and beings of all kinds (Rochat, 2014, p. 221). 
Regarding the intention of deception and the discursive production thereof, it is interesting to 
wonder which frame we apply when this happens, to wonder whether the agent uses deception to 
have fun, to inform (or misinform), or to solve a problem, just to mention a few possible frames. 
For example, in the context of solving a problem, McCornack et al. (2014) suggest the following: 
 
Applying opportunistic problem-solving models to deception suggests intriguing 
possibilities related to the reasoning processes underlying deceptive discourse 
production (McCornack, 1997)… As Hovy (1990) elaborates, “We usually begin 
to speak before we have planned out a full utterance, and then proceed while 
performing certain planning tasks” (p. 166). Consider what this means for 
deception. The prevailing model of deceptive discourse production presumes a 
top-down, linear-sequential, stepwise process: people decide a priori to lie, 
cognitively construct a deceptive message, and then present this message as verbal 
and nonverbal behavior. In contrast, an opportunistic problem-solving model of 
deception suggests that we often begin speaking before any intent to deceive 
exists, and before such discourse actually becomes deceptive. While we are 
speaking (and streaming activated, relevant, truthful information from memory to 
speech production), we often opt “on the fly” to delete relevant information or 
include false information that then renders our discourse—mid-utterance—
functionally deceptive. Why? Because, while we are speaking, we continue to 
calculate initial-state/end-state discrepancies. And as new truthful information is 
activated in memory and marked as relevant for disclosure, if this information 
widens (rather than narrows) these discrepancies, we’ll respond by deleting or 
distorting it. (p. 355) 
 
 The position of these authors is challenging, and I will come back to this later. For now, it 
is worth noting that they explicitly sustain that often we begin to talk even before the intention of 
deception exists, and that in the course of the discursive production we start to plan, according to 
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the information we recover from memory, deleting or distorting it, forming a functionally 




Lying is the vilest prevaricative act. We emphasize this without scruples, despite the fact that we 
lie more than once a day, according to classic studies on the subject (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; 
Hample, 1980), and we do it for different reasons (Levine et al., 2010). 
 I will follow the definition of the lie proposed by D’Agostini (2014): lying is a performed 
linguistic act with the purpose of making others believe as true what is known to be false (p. 65). 
D’Agostini (2014) adds that we should be careful not to confuse lying with the mistake of 
someone saying something false without knowing the truth, a confusion that could occur if we 
follow the logicians’ indications of the truth. For the latter, untruth is the truth of the denial, 
hence: if “the cat is on the chair” is not true, then it is true that “the cat is not on the chair”. This 
is different from “all scholars have written a good book”, which is an obvious untruth, despite 
the fact that I only know scholars who have written good books, all said in good faith. On the 
other hand, the truth could be transmitted by saying only untruths. This last case happens to the 
inveterate mythomaniac, who, when he has the intention of telling the truth for once, knows that 
since people know him and his reputation as a liar, says false things to be sure that they will 
believe the contrary, which is the truth.  
It seems to be that the linguistic act of lying becomes a lie when the agent’s intention of 
lying is involved. This, in turn, implies three aspects: 1. That an agent believes something 
contrary to what is said, 2. That the agent has a certain set of beliefs, and 3. That the agent 
consciously inflicts some kind of damage on others. With regard to the first two aspects, a useful 
concept to understand the problem is the notion of the epistemic standard. This notion allows us 
to appreciate that the liar moves in a zone of vague beliefs. Hence, the liar does not need to 
totally believe in the opposite of what has been said, nor is it necessary that the receiver 
completely believes what is sustained. The liar may only be looking for a determined action of 
the listener caused by the linguistic stimulation (independent of whether her epistemic state has 
changed). With respect to the awareness of damage potentially provoked, it is necesary that the 
agent knows for certain that what is said has bad consequences, which empirically is an uncertain 
fact.  
 With regard to the pious lie (the favoured justification of religious believers of all faiths), 
which tends to be thought of as a separate case, the given definition of a lie applies without a 
doubt, since it converges the properties indicated, and the lack of transparency is clear, including 
when the objective is altruistic. It is highly likely that this type of lying is more forgivable than 
others, because the damage is temporary and the positive outcome might endure.  
 What links self-deception to deception and lies is the cognitive effort to obtain more 
behavioural resources to achieve certain goals when transparent, truthful, honest and benevolent 
behaviour is not enough. This has been a communal co-evolutionary achievement between the 
deceiver and the deceived. As Levine et al. (2010) sustain, we deceive to maintain a certain 
reputation, to manage social relations, get advantages from a social exchange (particularly when 
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2.4. Manipulation: towards an axiology of manipulative discourse 
 
The word manipulation has a bad reputation. Not even when joking could it be said that 
manipulation is at play during a given interaction. Including from an academic point of view 
(discourse analysis), manipulations are revealed when they go against nationalist or cultural 
feelings of the author of the analysis (Lihua, 2012). As can be imagined, often the analyses are 
centred on political phenomena, precisely because their actors tend to be accused of 
manipulations and where, worthy of further study, discourse analysts tend to see the perfect 
corpus.2 Other authors take for granted the definition of manipulation (Littleﬁeld, 2013) and 
operate by default, practically without offering any further explanation. 
 However, as Maillat and Oswald (2009, 2011; Oswald, 2014)3 have emphasized, critical- 
discourse analysis does not have a definition that accounts for all the aspects involved in a 
manipulative exchange, and fails because it offers only essentialist distinctions. For these 
authors, manipulation can be defined as a cognitive phenomenon in which a speaker diverts 
access to critical information within the context of selection, while it could increase the 
accessibility to information suitable for the speaker’s goal to make her message accepted by the 
listener. According to a cognitive-pragmatist vision, these authors do not need to refer to features 
such as the manipulative intention of the agent, since what matters is the way in which the 
information processing functions (including cognitive biases, dual mind system, heuristic 
processes, etc.). Sincerity, which critical discourse analysts embrace, is of little importance to 
them because there are true yet manipulative statements, such as for example “the captain hasn’t 
arrived drunk today”. But at this point, Maillat and Oswald  (2009; 2011) are confused, because 
the statement is ironic, and irony has its own pragmatic game rules; furthermore, they consider 
the existence of virtuous manipulations, like the case of Santa Claus or similar ones. When they 
say that the intention or interest of the speaker does not have analytical importance, they have an 
incomplete approach to the problem, because manipulation should also be analyzed from the 
point of view of the effects and from the point of view of the personality of the speaker (more on 
this later). These authors see that manipulation takes advantage of, and exploits, a cognitive 
dynamic: it is about restrictive communication that plays with the selection of contextual 
assumptions, that rests on the same contextual selection procedures as the “normal” statement 
cases. It seems to be, from this point of view, that now manipulation could enjoy a better 
reputation.  
But manipulation is what it is (whoever deals with it gains little) because it contains 
features of the family we have called generalized deception: self-deception (as in the case of 
supposedly altruistic manipualtion), deceptions (concealment, implication of false belief) and lies 
(saying the contrary of what one thinks); and uses all of them to exploit potential errors where 
the structural mental design could fail. The core of manipulative behaviour is, without doubt, the 
intention of the manipulator, because she is the one who wants to influence the action of an 
audience for her own benefit, directly or indirectly.  
On this matter, I coincide with D’Agostini’s (2014) perspective, when she sustains that 
“manipulation … operates by means of a series of semi-truths or alleged truths which are said, 
[true] able to influence the beliefs of others, to push them to think and act in a manner contrary to 
their interests, or harmful to themself and others, and would never be adopted outside of the 
system of manipulation” (p. 97). What is shared by deception and manipulation is that the 
                                                          
2 Note, for example, Chilton (2005), van Dijk (1994; 2005; 2006), or the analysis of Blass (2005). 
3 The original work on cognitive manipulation pragmatically viewed is probably Saussure (2005). 
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consequences or responsibilities of the interaction are on the victim’s side (I am the one who 
accepts the implication in a deception, and I am also the one who acts erroneously in the 
manipulation). Whereas when I lie I am not free to believe; one is the victim of direct insincerity. 
It is clear then that the liar-manipulator is simply, on an axiological scale, the darkest member of 
the family of generalized deception. Manipulation, as if it weren’t enough, holds another 
characteristic which makes it particularly damaging: its consequences are continuous, the 
manipulated agent may live permanently in this situation, unless things become completely 
transparent, in which case the manipulator can still deny any responsibility or participation.4 
Are we only talking about the manipulator exploiting the possibilities of an error of a 
mind strategically prone to bias (Kurzban, 2012)? Or also about a certain type of psychology—
intentionally—designed for manipulation? The discourse analyst, with a picture of the 
phenomenon half-revealed, would tend to opt for the first alternative; an effort to understand all 
the cognitive dimensions of the problem should also lean towards the content of the second 
question. There is a growing bibliography which suggests, after various experimental studies, the 
existence of a type of Machiavellian manipulative profile (Austin, Farrelly, Black, & Moore, 
2007; Bagozzi et al., 2013; Lyons, Caldwell, & Schultz, 2010). 
 In Bereczkei’s works (2015; Bereczkei & Birkas, 2014) one of the most light-shedding 
proposals on the matter can be found. In their approximation, experimental data from Trust 
Games and Public Good Games are combined with information from cerebral analyses (fMRI), 
and with quantitive and qualitative psychological studies. Although the ideas of this 
approximation are still under further investigation, it has been determined that people who take 
advantage of others through manipulation are capable of flexibly adapting to an ever-changing 
social environment, they have superior cognitive capacities relative to an efficient response to the 
service of their interest facing the behaviour of others, and they demonstrate specific brain 
activations linked to the processes of decision making. Manipulators are different from 
psychopaths, for example, in that the latter show a rigid short-range behaviour. Machiavellism is 
a strategy of social behaviour to manipulate others for personal benefits (Wilson, Near, & Miller, 
1996). In general, these behavioural and psychological profiles have as their core characteristic 
the fact that they see human interactions as deceptive and have a cynical view of human nature 
(seeing others as weak and unreliable) and undermine moral conventionality (Hawley, 2006). 
They can distance themselves from moral principles, particularly in situations that offer material 
rewards for breaking rules. As Bereczkei (2015) summarizes, these people are highly 
emotionally unstable, contrary to what old literature considered them to be: cold-blooded and 
calculating. But the manipulator is rather eminently flexible and constantly evaluates the social 
situation and those involved (p. 24). It has been concluded (Bereczkei & Czibor, 2014), after 
Public Good Games experiments, that they are more sensitive to situational factors and widely 
take into account the behaviour of their fellows, and based on those evaluations the possible 
success of the exploitation of others.  
Taking into account the results of multiple investigations with the dual mind theory 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013), Bereczkei (2015) and his colleagues propose that 
Machiavellians have specialized in planning cognitive domains that contain both types of 
thinking (automatic and reflexive). They specifically state that they have a high capacity for 
permanent monitoring of the other (although they are weak in mindreading), processing 
                                                          
4 D’Agostini (2014) also analyzes the paradigmatic political manipulation tactic: spin doctoring, which is the 
distortion of facts by means of actual facts; the most extreme case is meta-manipulation, which consists of a 
manipulation to destroy a manipulation, i.e., it is the pretended unmasking of alleged lies (‘complot’) (p. 105).  
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characteristics and traits of people to adjust their behaviour accordingly. Bereczkei (2015) 
suggests a heuristic rule to interpret this trait of manipulators: “‘Start with a relatively low 
investment, keep watching what the others are doing, and do not exceed the others’ contributions 
over the transaction’” (p. 27). Similarly, they are guided by objectives or tasks, rather than an 
orientation towards agreement with people. The author summarizes this as follows: 
 
They are not concerned about other people beyond their own self-interest. Instead, 
they steadily proceed on their own route and bother neither with their partner’s 
nor their own feelings. It is not surprising that one of their main personality 
characteristics is a high level of persistence that is unique to individuals who are 
ambitious, strive for higher accomplishments, and tend to intensify their efforts in 
response to anticipated reward (Bereczkei & Czibor, 2014). The related cognitive 
algorithm says: ‘Choose the strategy that is supposed to be efﬁcient and keep it 
against the disturbing and obstructive environmental effects’. I think, this rule 
would not be used by psychopaths who are mainly characterized by immediate 
gratiﬁcation, impulsivity, and short-term thinking, instead of task orientation and 
long-term thinking (Jones & Paulhus, 2010)…The majority of experts in the ﬁeld 
agree that one of the Machiavellians’ most characteristic features is reward 
seeking (Birkás, Csathó, Gács, & Bereczkei, 2015; Jones & Paulhus, 2009;Wilson 
et al., 1996)… In certain circumstances they could achieve their goal by acquiring 
an immediate reward, but in other conditions they use indirect tactics, and get 
rewarded via a long-run operation, (e.g. via pretend altruism). Especially difﬁcult 
situations may be for them a high-risk social environment where the others’ 
behavior is unpredictable and, therefore, the acquisition of reward is uncertain. In 
this case, an appropriate cognitive rule would be the following: ‘Strive for getting 
the reward at any moment when the beneﬁt outweighs the risk associated with its 
acquisition’. (Bereczkei, 2015, p. 28) 
 
The most painfully striking characteristic of the Machiavellian manipulators is their 
inhibition in regard to cooperative impulses. The heuristic that Bereczkei (2015) incorporates 
here is: Don’t follow the immediate and pre-emptive impulses that could hinder the acquirement 
of greater benefit. They tend to neglect their impulses in situations of justice (or equality of 
conditions), and maintain their self-oriented impulses in unfair situations. Armed with this 
mental equipment, the Machiavellian manipulator elects the victim who involves the least cost 
and lowest risk to ensure the greatest profit.  
Where does this psychological profile originate from? The answer, although still general, 
confirms a daily experience: 
 
A more recent study, using a retrospective parental care questionnaire, revealed 
that low maternal care led to the development of Machiavellianism via the fearful 
attachment as a possible mediating factor (Jonason, Lyons, & Bethell, 2014). It is 
not surprising, then, that the young Machiavellians were characterized by distrust, 
dishonesty, and cynicism. They also lacked empathy and a faith in human 
benevolence (McIllwain, 2003; Slaughter, 2011; Sutton & Keogh, 2000 )… 
Similarly, in an environment where mutual distrust and communication problems 
prevail, they will learn to permanently monitor others in order to adjust their 
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behavior to the demands of the family environment. They may also develop a 
capability of searching for rewards in the hope of getting resources in a poor and 
unpredictable environment during childhood, and inhibiting their immediate 
social-emotional responses to avoid costly and unbeneﬁcial interpersonal 
relationships. (Bereczkei, 2015, p. 29) 
 
As highlighted above, what Sperber et al. (2010) call epistemic vigilance (to check more 
carefully, for example, the content that has been received in virtue of a certain mistrust of the 
source emitting the message) should be continuously activated in the context of general doubt, 
for the purpose of auscultating Machiavellian manipulators because they are by default, as the 
quote shows, systematically monitoring in order to take advantage of the opportunity and the 
potential victim. 
Considering the preceeding discussion, I propose the following definition of 
manipulation: the linguistic ongoing act that intentionally uses at some point in the interaction a 
certain type of self-deception, deception and/or lie, to covertly achieve a goal that represents a 
loss for the immediate recipient or for a subsequent recipient. Manipulation, as a linguistic act, 
finishes when it is discovered, but this does not assure, obviously, that the consequences stop 
being produced. An example of this is the use of malicious rumours (Sunstein, 2014). 
The following schematic representation tries to systematize an axiology of manipulation 
that contains the basic elements of its manifestation: 
 
Fig. 1. Manipulation Axiology 
 























+ - - 
S damages R1 and Rn for her own benefit. 
 
Prototypical Case: A politician hides facts, deceives or 
lies in discourse X to get R1’s vote, damaging Rn as well 








+ - + 
S damages R1, deceiving her or lying to her, for a 
posterior good for Rn.  
 
Example: Justification for a war, a revolution. 








+ + - 
S hides information and her ulterior objectivea from R1, 
without inflicting damage on her but damaging Rn. 
 
Example: The manipulative rumour put forward by S that 
does not damage R1 directly but damages the community 
(Rn).  
 
The example of the bank run in which R1 takes out and 
protects her savings is not damaging but it is for the 
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+ (-) + + 
S self-deceives and deceives by concealing information 
and her ulterior objective from R1 for R1’s, supposed, 
benefit and, in a subsidiary way, the whole community 
(Rn) benefits.  
 
Example: Santa Claus (Traditions in general?) 
Scenario A (prototypical manipulation with most damage), until D (altruistic manipulation); S: speaker; R1: direct or 
immediate recipient; Rn: indirect or ulterior recipient; + and  -, benefit and damage respectively. 
 
In all the scenarios, S manipulates the discourse to manipulate the recipient, using self-deception, 
deception or lies. This manipulative axiology is certainly not exempt from problems. One of the 
problems appears in scenario A, because it is difficult to know and evaluate more or less 
objectively the final or total effects of the manipulation in Rn, since time could change the 
understanding of the facts and what was said in order to decide whether the actions and hidden 
goals of S inflict damage. In scenario D, self-deception is typically observed because it is not a 
justification of the alleged benefits for R1 and Rn to commit a deception. S self-deceives, 
believing that the results liberate her from expressing a lie or falsehood. 
 
3. Social influence bias: Between benefits and damages  
 
The contemporary concept of the social influence bias has conformity and social pressure as 
background concepts. We should keep this in mind, even at an intuitive level, because 
conformity and social pressure are the basic forces underlying this bias. According to a broad 
definition, bias is a pattern of behaviour that shows some distortion when processing information 
from the outside world, and one of its consequences is that it makes us emit innacurate or 
tendentious judgements. As for social, this bias is attributional, that is, it affects our collective 
interaction.5 Theoretically, cognitive and attributional biases should be in line with the tendency 
to self-deceive, deceive, lie and manipulate, because all these behaviours provide us with 
benefits when managing our emotional state, our opinions about the world and others, and 
interactions, in the most low-cost way from the point of view of cognitive energy, and in the 
fastest way from the point of view of social interactions. In the two examples below the concepts 
previously discussed can be observed in play.  
 
3.1. Asch’s experiment: Self-Deception well justified? 
 
The simple and extraordinary experiment that Solomon Asch carried out in 1951 is classic within 
the psychology of reasoning. It brings together eight people who concur in performing a task of 
perception. Seven of them are aware that everything is fake, that is, the experiment does not 
measure perceptual ability, but the behaviour of one single subject (a young male student) in 
terms of whether it is posible to form an opinion contrary to the majority. A sheet of paper is 
shown to the group with four lines different in size, the line separate from the other three is the 
                                                          
5 Here is not the place to detail the discussion of the concepts of limited rationality, ecological rationality, social 
rationality and the dual mind theory, to understand the conceptual disagreements between descriptive and normative 
social understanding of perceptual errors and decision-making bias. For an updated summary of part of this 
discussion, see for example Evans (2009; 2010; 2011), Frankish (2009), Gigerenzer (2008; 2010).  
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reference line. The experiment subjects must compare the lines and say which of the three is 
identical in size to the reference line. To give an impression of truth, in the first two rounds the 
seven confederates give the right answer, but in the third round they start to fail consistently, and 
there the subject under experiment begins to respond in accordance with them.6 According to 
Asch’s reported results (1951; 1955; 1956), there were a considerable amount of subjects that 
conformed to what the group said, 36.8%.  
What is important for this work is the type of response given by the subjects in the 
experiment once they were interviewed, after it was confessed that they had been the victim of 
manipulation, and expressed their opinions about their behaviour once the fake experimental 
context was disclosed. In the interviews, in accordance with Asch (1951), it was evident that 
some always trusted their correct answer contrary to the majority, but still held that “I do not 
deny that at times I had the feeling: ‘to go with it, I'll go along with the rest’” (p. 182); while the 
subject who followed the group said that “I suspected about the middle—but tried to push it out 
of my mind” (p. 182). Among those who followed the group, the interviews showed at least three 
types of justifications: 1) some thought that the confederates were correct without being 
conscious that they gave, in fact, incorrect answers; Asch (1951) called this behaviour and 
justification, perception distortion; 2) other subjects pointed out that after various answers they 
concluded that they were misinterpreting the stimulus and that the majority must be right; Asch 
called this behaviour and justification, judgement distortion; 3) in the group of those who only 
rarely followed the majority, the justification was that they knew that they gave the right answer, 
but they followed the majority because they simply did not want to be seen as displaying deviant 
behaviour from the majority; Asch (1951) called this last case distortion of action.  
What do these justifications tell us with regard to the combination of persuasion and 
generalized deception? Various things. Firstly, and from a methodological point of view, that the 
manipulative experiment itself reveals how natural the practice is of reproducing self-deception 
with ulterior benefits (scenario B in our axiology), whose second-order justification is the 
scientific need; remember that this type of experiment is still repeated today in psychology 
departments across the globe. The question in this context would be: Can it be expected that a 
deceptive (experimental) artificial environment promotes, as a response, the self-deceptive 
behaviour of the participants?; secondly, and following Bereczkei’s (2015) reflection, can it be 
that the social influence bias causes a heuristic which functions as an argumentative (toulminian) 
warrant: although the answer of the majority may be incorrect, your conformity is justified by the 
minor necessity to contradict the group. For contexts that are trivial and artificial, such as that of 
the experiment, it is reasonable to expect that we behave ourselves in accordance with the group: 
the incentive is to remain obedient in front of the pack (optimized social cognitive skill). 
But in non-trivial contexts, the same tends to happen. Sunstein (2015) reports the case in 
the American political, financial and musical world. The political example is that no one opposes 
Kennedy´s decision, supported by the White House’s oldest council group, to invade Cuba, 
despite there being many good reasons to seek a diplomatic resolution, as evidenced by a young 
advisor—many years later—who participated in these meetings and did not raise his voice for 
fear of dissent from the group of veterans and to be labelled as a softie. So that in situations of 
social asymmetry, the self-imposed silence is exacerbated by pressure and social influence. In 
music, we tend to download music downloaded by others. The phenomenon known as Cascade 
is widely seen in the financial and economic world, in all types of business: we tend to support, 
follow and even uphold established public arguments, ignoring our previous knowledge on the 
                                                          
6 The experiment has been carried out with many variations until today, and Asch himself also used many variations. 
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subject, deceiving ourselves without serious remorse and lying without hesitation, just to 
converge with the rest. Asch’s (1951) experiment, such as these last examples show, makes clear 
that the group’s reason is a justified reason to deceive ourselves.  
 
3.2. Self-deception, deception and lies in humour 
 
José Sánchez Mota is a Spanish comedian who has been successful for many years on Spanish 
TV. His programmes combine specific sketches with different characters. As a good comedian 
would have it, his leitmotifs are to ridicule and make fun of daily stupidities, particularly those 
pertinent to Spanish culture, but also to Iberian culture (and probably beyond). In 2015, he 
launched a series of sketches which always started with the protagonist´s self-deceptive doubt. 
Facing the problems, adventures and misadventures that could come about in the plot and the 
sketch´s specific interaction, the protagonist points out: it could be no... but if yes... this is what 
worries me, the if yes. It also has the opposite value at times: yes, yes… but if not… 
 The part that concerns me starts with the casual encounter between the protagonist, who 
carries papers in his hands, and a new female neighbour who has recently moved to the 
neighbourhood. She is young, attractive and sure of herself. He drops his papers, and the new 
neighbour apologizes, to which Mota responds: no, no, nothing happened (don’t worry), while 
both bend over to collect the papers. Once they are standing straight again, there is an exchange 
of looks which couldn’t be said to hold anything special, but Mota looking at the camera, reacts 
by saying: Here there was something happening... See that, maybe not, but if yes.7  
It is true that from the point of view of probabilities, the protagonist might have positive 
expectations about the girl, there might have been a hint of a possible advantage for him, but the 
humorous effect is precisely created by the distance between the desire of an unattractive older 
man and the desire of a young woman. Facing the evident reality, the individual self-deceives 
and says: a ver que a lo mejor no, pero y si sí (let’s see, maybe not, but if yes). Trivers (2011) 
relates the same case of self-deception. It happened when he was walking with one of his Ph.D. 
students while they were having an intellectual and inspired conversation with what he 
understood to be mild insinuations, but as they passed by a window that reflected his image, he 
realized the stark reality: an 80-year old man bent over, walking slowly. There Trivers (2011) 
realizes the self-deception that pushes his mind, making him believe that he is an interesting and 
attractive man for a romantic conquest, but who only exists in his glorious mental self-image. It 
is the strategic mistake of which Kurzban (2012) speaks. 
The dialogue between Mota and his neighbour continues. They introduce themselves (her 
name is Marga) and they point out the apartments where they live. He looks at the camera and 
asks: but with or without a boyfriend... but in the actual dialogue, he asks this less directly, and 
she replies that her relationship is over, information which Mota uses to confirm his self-
deception saying meta-reflexively in an ironic way directly to the camera: and me worried, look 
how I am trembling...  
The young woman is moving her house, so Mota offers his help, and says to the camera: 
let´s see, these are extra hours that one puts in with the intention of sending the invoice 
[metaphor to refer to paying the favour back in sexual terms], which maybe they won´t pay, but if 
yes if yes... The ridiculousness is completed via self-deception when the scene is resumed with 
Mota carting furniture and admitting in front of the camera: yes I am being ridiculous, but if 
not?. Then he pretends to be a strong man and lifts a box which weighs 65 kilograms, and the 
                                                          
7 The sketch can be seen at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jSW-gRp0TRY 
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dialogue is: (she) Are you okay, is it too heavy?, (he) No, no, no; she says: hey, thanks a lot, 
you’re a sweetheart; to which he looks at the camera and says: yes, yes, don´t say no, here 
yes…Then she asks: Hey, so are you married or…? Before responding, Mota looks at the camera 
and says: we have to get out of this in any possible way… His response to the young woman is 
yes, but a little… After which he looks at the camera and says:  what I said was a small stupid 
thing… With this final twist, many things are observed: That self-deception is helped by 
deception, he tells the truth (that he’s married), but tries to imply another interpretation with a 
weird quantification applied to the adjective (married, but only a little!), which creates an 
oxymoron: Marriage cannot be quantified; and admitting while looking at the camera that he said 
something stupid, it becomes manipulation scenario type A: damage to R1 (the girl) and Rn (his 
wife).  
Mota’s telephone rings during this exchange, he leaves the heavy box of books on the 
ground, he answers his wife’s call telling her that he can’t speak and that he will call her in five 
minutes. It’s similar to the example given above with regard to the husband who stayed after 
work in his office having a conversation with a (female) colleague: Mota doesn’t lie, but he does 
not tell the truth either, that he’s helping his new and attractive neighbour to move. But 
unfortunately, his wife appears seconds later, and here begins the ridiculousness to which we are 
exposed when we behave with self-deceptions, deceptions and manipulations. The sitcom is fed 




Mota: It’s just that... well... I hung up on you, no... it’s just that I’m helping our 
neighbour here to carry some boxes... 
Marga: Hello, how are you? I’m Marga [extends her hand to introduce herself], 
the new neighbour... 
Wife: I’m Jose´s wife [and she doesn´t extend her hand]... 
Mota: Yes, yes, she is known as my wife... well now, here Marga’s boxes, this is 
Paula, my wife [presenting the boxes to his wife]... [the three laugh falsely] 
Wife: Aren’t you funny? 
Mota: Ehm?.... [looks closely at the camera and says] well, let’s see here, why 
should I  feel bad? For something I haven´t done, what could I be accused of?, Of 
pre-cheating, at the most, and that, where would it take us? Compared to the 
immensity of the ocean, what is it?, an insignificant thing, pre-cheating, OK, will 
you send someone to jail for that?, let’s see, I would have done it, yes, but if not… 
[he starts talking to his wife again]: darling, I was helping her mainly because the 
doctor told me to carry heavy things now and then, because that helps your 
vertebral spine which…. 
Wife: … which you now have totally destroyed.  
Mota: [looks at the camera], she got me, she got me in the end, I say this so many 
times [that his back is totally destroyed] …[the new neighbour is watching the 
situation without demonstrating anything in particular, after which Mota 
concludes]... all right, yes, the woman who is going to be my lover is annoyed 
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In this humorous piece, one can observe with clarity what McCornack et al. (2014) point 
out about the fact that we generate deceptions while the problems are happening in order to fix 
them online, and that we think or plan deceptions while we are producing discourse. We speak 
first and then we notice the deception. At the same time, Mota’s wife refines her epistemic 
vigilance, every second distrusting Mota a little more. Mota begins to reveal his Machiavellian 
profile (Bereczkei, 2015). When some sincerity is expected (when his wife reveals his painful 
behaviour), Mota begins a self-deception of the second order, that is, he starts to justify his 
behaviour, towards the new neighbour, with bad reasons to sustain that his behaviour actually is 
not a problem; these very same reasons show that Mota is lying to himself.  
In addition, the example allows us to see, with regard to the relationship between 
generalized deception and persuasion, that the efforts to resolve argumentative problems in 
deceptive contexts, push the agent in such a way (nervousness imposes a cognitive burden that 
minimizes care and attention in parallel cognitive tasks) that makes him use argumentative 
stategies in a defective way (incorrect analogies: this compared to the greatness of the ocean. 
What is it? An insignificance). It seems to be then that in a generalized deception context the 
possibility of giving bad reasons is increased. 
Why is this case also an example of the way social influence bias works? Maybe the 
answer lies in the continuation of the sketch when a new participant is introduced, a handsome 
young man who also lives in the neighbourhood. He introduces himself to the group (Mota, 
Paula and Marga), and also offers his help to the new young attractive neighbour. His behaviour, 
like that of Mota, is peer behaviour that mutually influences and pressures its cultural ecology 
and that has non-trivial consequences. The sketch finishes with Mota admitting that he got more 
than he bargained for; which apparently means that the Machiavellian manipulator finally is 
defeated. But, his last words are: yes, I got more than I bargained for… and I got out… in the 




While I was writing this paper, manipulation scandals in commerce were made public in Chile. 
For many years, businesses dealing in chickens, toilet paper, medicine, groceries, clothing (and it 
seems the list continues), colluded—fixing prices between themselves without having the 
competitive free market function as such. In the international arena, it was also revealed in 2015 
that the German company Volkswagen physically manipulated the software to measure the petrol 
of their cars, while they simultaneously manipulated the news until they could no longer stop the 
investigations in the United States which revealed this manipulation. 
What do both manipulations have in common? According to two Nobel Prize laureates in 
economics, Akerlof and Shiller (2015), manipulations and deceptions in the global political and 
economic system have in common the cheating behaviour at the heart of its own operative 
logic—as its primary force to push market renovation. Deception in the current economy, 
according to the authors, is in turn based on the old liberal economic belief of the market’s 
balance: if I don’t deceive you, someone else will.  
So evidently, we shouldn’t only consider mental biases, discursive forms and personality 
types to understand self-deception, deception, lies and manipulations, but also the cultural 
practices and contexts where generalized deception is favoured by our narrative necessity: There 
is always a deceptively presented product which comes to fill a need that does not exist. The 
recipe, according to Akerlof and Shiller to change the state of affairs is to rewrite our mental 
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frameworks. Perhaps, the recipe of someone working on cognition and argumentation theory 
would be to have the liar justify himself and, for this reason, make a fool of himself. 
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